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The Harm of Symbolic Actions and Green-washing: Corporate Actions and 





We examine over 100 top performing Canadian firms in visibly polluting industries 
as we seek to answer four research questions: What specific environmental issues are 
firms addressing? How do these issues differ between industries? Are both symbolic 
and substantive actions financially beneficial? Does green-washing, measured as the 
difference between symbolic and substantive action, and/or green-highlighting, 
measured as the combined effect of symbolic and substantive actions, pay? We find 
that substantive actions of environmental issues (green walk) neither harm nor 
benefit firms financially, but symbolic actions (green talk) are negatively related to 
financial performance. We also find that green-washing (discrepancy between green 
talk and green walk) has a negative effect on financial performance and green-
highlighting (concentrated efforts of the talk and walk) has no effect on financial 




KEY WORDS: Corporate environmental performance, corporate websites, environmental 
categories, green-highlighting, green-washing, substantive actions, symbolic actions, green walk, 
green talk.  
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The Harm of Symbolic Actions and Green-washing: Corporate Actions and 
Communications on Environment Issues and Their Financial Implications 
 
 
 Margolis and Walsh (2003: 268) began their seminal article on how misery loves 
company by bluntly stating: “The world cries out for repair”. Eight years later the world’s cries 
are increasingly desperate, particularly in the environmental area. Global environmental 
problems such as climate change, resource scarcity, ozone depletion, pollution, and habitat 
destruction continue to expand with alarming speed, exceeding even the worst case scenarios 
predicted only a few years ago (Pacala & Socolow, 2004). Building off the work of scientists, 
activists and others, Al Gore’s 2006 documentary—An Inconvenient Truth—brought substantial 
changes to the public discourse and perception of climate change and helped reshape the role of 
environmental protection in every citizen’s life; from an infrequent conversation to a moral 
obligation (Lovgren, 2006). This new public discourse on environmental sustainability puts 
pressure on corporations as they have been portrayed as one of the key causes of climate change 
and environmental problems (Hawken, 1993; Korten, 1995).  
As a result, numerous companies now take an active role in environmental management, 
some going as far as lobbying slow-moving governments for greater environmental regulations. 
However, others deal with the issues more strategically. For example, green-washing, a strategy 
that companies adopt to engage in symbolic communications of environmental issues without 
substantially addressing them in actions, has been identified by both academia and the 
mainstream media (e.g., Laufer, 2003; Ramus & Montiel, 2005 for academic and the 
environmental marketing firm Terrachoice is increasingly in the mainstream media). However, 
our knowledge of the corporate strategic communications on environmental performance 
The Harm of Symbolic Actions and Green-Washing  
3 
 
remains incomplete, and furthermore, the prevalence of green-washing and its financial 
implications have yet to be empirically examined.  
Accordingly, the objective of this paper is to develop a better understanding of corporate 
communications on environmental performance and the resulting financial implications. Using a 
sample from the Financial Post’s top 500 Canadian companies in 2008 we analyze corporate 
websites as we seek to answer four research questions: 1) What specific environmental issues are 
the top firms in Canada addressing? 2) How do these issues differ between industries? 3) Are 
both symbolic and substantive actions financially beneficial? 4) Does green-washing and/or 
green-highlighting pay? 
Via the lens of corporate communications on environmental issues, our work advances 
our understanding of environmental performance of firms in several ways. First, prior research 
typically discusses environmental performance as an all encompassing construct, similar to 
reputation (i.e., see review, Walker, 2010). Yet we argue that environmental performance is 
composed of numerous separate issues, such as greenhouse-gas-emissions, environmental 
conservation and restoration, stakeholder engagement, product innovation, lifecycle analysis, 
environmental management systems, technological development, waste management, recycling, 
and independent environmental reviews/audits. To better understand environmental performance 
we think it is important to know which environmental issues firms are actively managing, and 
how these might differ across industries. For example, product innovation may be important for a 
chemical company, but less so for an oil and gas company which might be more concerned with 
greenhouse-gas-emissions. Thus instead of simply showing differences across one measure of 
environmental performance (research has tended to focus on emissions), we examine multiple 
categories.  
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Second, we address the criticism that prior research needs to examine environmental 
performance outside the predominant U.S. sample by focusing on Canadian firms (Salzman, 
Lonescu-Somers & Steger, 2005). The use of Canadian firms is also pertinent to our area of 
investigation as Canada is a resource-rich country with numerous firms operating in visibly 
polluting industries. In particular, Canadian companies are well-represented in our four 
industries of interest: forestry, energy, mining and chemical industries. Lastly, unlike the United 
States, Canada has publicly committed to emission reductions in signing the Kyoto Protocol and 
was one of the first signing countries (http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/kyoto/timeline.html), 
thus Canadian companies may feel greater regulatory pressure to be green, to green-wash, or 
both. 
 Third, different from previous work discussing green-washing at a conceptual level, we 
put forth arguments linking green-washing to firms’ financial performances. To date, however, 
we are not aware of a study that has examined the financial implications to green-washing. 
Green-washing represents a relatively recent area of research inquiry because of the increased 
prevalence of environmental concerns and the attractiveness and effectiveness of marketing and 
advertising oneself as being green (e.g., Laufer, 2003; Ramus & Montiel, 2005). In an attempt to 
cash in on the green movement many firms with poor environmental performance sell 
themselves as being green. There are two motives for firms to engage in green-washing. The first 
motive is to attain legitimacy according to institutional theory (Oliver 1991). Second, according 
to signalling theory (Connelly, 2011), appearing to conform to green norms by engaging in 
symbolic actions or green talk can be effective at signalling to external stakeholders the firms’ 
values with regard to green issues (Ramus & Montiel, 2005). Implementation wise, managers 
may prefer symbolic actions to substantive actions on environmental issues as signalling green 
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values is easier and permits greater internal flexibility than implementing these values with 
actions (Suchman, 1995). For example, Russo and Harrison (2005) found that ISO 14001 
certification was paradoxically associated with greater toxic air emissions. They speculated that 
this might be because certification gives the appearance of being green without requiring any 
substantive actions on the part of the company. Similarly, evidence of green-washing has been 
found in setting up corporate governance structures (Westphal & Zajac, 1994; Zajac & Westphal, 
1995), and in framing firms' ethics codes (Weaver, Trevino & Cochran, 1999).  
The last contribution of our paper is that we develop a new concept which we label 
green-highlighting. In contrast to green-washing (which we conceptualize as the difference 
between symbolic and substantive actions), green-highlighting represents the combination of 
symbolic and substantive actions, where the firm discusses environmental responsibility in terms 
of what they are doing currently or have done (substantive action), and what they plan to do in 
the future (symbolic action). We develop green-highlighting to differentiate a firm whose motive 
is to engage in green talk to manage their corporate image (i.e., green-washing), from a firm 
whose green talk (symbolic actions) is accompanied with green walk (substantive actions). No 
prior work has contrasted these two types of communications and examined the financial 
implications to the combined effect of symbolic and substantive actions. 
 This paper will proceed as follows: we first discuss our hypotheses which investigate 
symbolic actions, substantive actions, green-washing, and green-highlighting. We do not make 
hypotheses for our first two research questions as they are descriptive. Next we describe the 
methods including the sample, the coding of the corporate websites and the operationalization of 
the variables. We then present the results followed by a discussion, and conclude with the 
limitations and areas for future research. 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
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 With escalating global environmental problems and the perception that business is a 
major contributor to these problems (Hawken, 1993; Korten, 1995), corporations are under 
mounting pressure to perform environmentally. Research has found that under pressures from the 
external environment, some companies respond symbolically with little to no substance 
(Westphal & Zajac, 1998; Westphal & Zajac, 2001), while others take substantive actions to 
address their environmental performance (Weaver et al., 1999). Firms engaging in either 
symbolic or substantive actions are attempting to gain legitimacy among stakeholders.  
 A frequently used definition of legitimacy refers to it as “a generalized perception or 
assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially 
constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman 1995: 574). A more 
recent examination of legitimacy described it as actor’s perceptions or judgements manifested in 
behavioural actions (Bitektine, 2011: 152).  Attaining legitimacy is important for organizations 
as it can lead to greater access to resources, stronger exchange relationships with business 
partners, and better job applicants—subsequently leading to a stronger work force (Aldrich & 
Fiol, 1994; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Oliver, 1991; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Turban & 
Greening, 1997). Ultimately, the benefits to increased legitimacy translate into improved 
financial performance (Deephouse, 1999). 
 Suddaby and Greenwood (2005) discuss comprehensibility as one of two types of 
cognitive legitimacy. They note that a key insight from this literature is an actor’s use of 
symbolic devices to gain legitimacy (and offer empirical examples provided by Hargadon and 
Douglas (2001) and Rao (2002) for example). Pushing this even further is the observation that 
firms need only appear to conform to attain legitimacy (Oliver, 1991). Indeed, as we explain in 
the next section, a rational-actor may conserve resources by using symbolic as opposed to 
substantive actions. 




 Although research examining the relationship between environmental and financial 
performance has been mixed (Salzman, Ionescu-Somers & Steger, 2005), the majority of 
research have found a positive relationship (Russo & Fouts, 1997; Margolis & Walsh, 2003; 
Orlitzky, Schmidt & Rynes, 2003). Reasons for the positive link include reduced costs, gaining 
competitive parity, and regulatory advantages associated with environmental performance. 
Specifically, environmental performance can reduce costs by lowering compliance costs, 
reducing waste, and improving efficiency and productivity (Ambec & Lanoie, 2008; Hart, 1995; 
Hart & Ahuja, 1996). Empirical research has demonstrated that environmental performance can 
lead to a competitive advantage through product differentiation (Ambec & Lanoie, 2008; Porter 
& van der Linde, 1995), international competitive advantages (Hart, 1995; Miles & Covin, 
2000), greater appeal to consumers (Miles & Covin, 2000), improvements in legitimacy (Bansal 
& Clelland, 2004), strengthening firm reputation (Hart, 1995; Miles & Covin, 2000), selling of 
pollution control technology (Ambec & Lanoie, 2008), the creation of entry barriers (Dean & 
Brown, 1995; Hart, 1995; Russo & Fouts, 1997), and the development of new market 
opportunities and better access to markets  (Ambec & Lanoie, 2008). Environmental 
performance has also been shown to offer regulatory advantages by leading to greater flexibility 
to adapt to legislative changes (Bansal & Bogner, 2002), through the ability to influence 
environmental laws and regulations (Faucheux et al., 1998; Hart, 1995; Hillman & Hitt, 1999; 
Miles & Covin, 2000), and by reducing or avoiding legal liabilities (Hart, 1995; Rooney, 1993). 
Similarly, research has found negative implications to poor environmental performance. 
For example, Hamilton (1995) found that firms reporting pollution figures to the TRI suffered 
statistically significant negative returns in stock value within a day. Dramatic events, such as an 
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oil spill, can have a large effect on firm profitability as investors react to the potential liabilities, 
fines, penalties, and clean-up costs (Bansal & Clelland, 2004). Konar and Cohen (2001) found 
that legal chemical releases reported to the TRI had a significant negative effect on the intangible 
asset values of firms. On the other hand, they found that for the average firm in their sample, a 
10 percent reduction in emissions resulted in a $34 million increase in market value. Lastly, 
Bansal and Clelland (2004) found that the release of new environmental information had an 
enduring impact on firms through the effect on unsystematic risk. Specifically, firms perceived 
as environmentally illegitimate experienced higher unsystematic risk. 
Thus taken together, empirical evidence suggests that environmental and financial 
performance are positively linked. We believe that the financial benefits for firms in polluting 
industries can only be obtained with substantive actions (and not with symbolic actions as we 
will argue in the next section). This is because the financial benefits to environmental 
performance are realized only through actual improvements in environmental responsibility. For 
example, research has shown that environmental performance can reduce costs by lowering 
compliance costs, reducing waste, and improving efficiency and productivity (Ambec & Lanoie, 
2008; Hart, 1995; Hart & Ahuja, 1996). Benefits such as lower compliance costs, reduced waste, 
and improvements in efficiency and productivity can only be obtained by real, substantive, 
actions, not symbolic actions. 
Hypothesis 1: Substantive actions will have a positive effect on financial performance 
Symbolic Action 
 From a rational-actor perspective we might expect managers and their organizations to 
act symbolically, as opposed to substantively, as appearing to conform is easier and permits 
greater internal flexibility than actual conformity while still conferring the benefits from 
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legitimacy (Suchman, 1995). Symbolic actions without substance have been found in the 
implementation of corporate governance structures (Westphal & Zajac, 1994; Zajac & Westphal, 
1995), ethics codes (Weaver et al., 1999), and ISO 14001 certification (Russo & Harrison, 2005).  
Even though symbolic actions could lead to greater appeal to consumers, and 
improvements in legitimacy and firm reputation based on signalling theory, we argue that  
symbolic actions pertaining to environmental performance will fail to confer legitimacy in our 
context. In particular, we argue that symbolic actions are harmful in visibly polluting industries 
for the following reasons. First, as we discussed earlier, to obtain financial benefits from greater 
environmental responsibility firms must actually, that is, substantively, engage in environmental 
performance. The symbolic engagement in environmental responsibility will not lead to lower 
compliance costs, waste reduction, or efficiency improvements (Ambec & Lanoie, 2008; Hart, 
1995; Hart & Ahuja, 1996), nor will it help to reduce or eliminate potential liabilities, fines, 
penalties, and clean-up costs (Bansal & Clelland, 2004). Thus firms using symbolic actions will 
fail to obtain the financial benefits to substantive environmental actions. Furthermore, in visibly 
polluting industries, this will harm them financially. This is the case because in visibly polluting 
industries firms are subject to greater stakeholder pressures and increased monitoring of their 
environmental performance (Berrone & Gomez-Mejia, 2009; Stevens et al., 2995).  
The increased stakeholder pressure comes from a variety of stakeholders, such as 
governments, suppliers, and customers (Weaver et al., 1999). These pressures are likely to lead 
to greater substantive and less symbolic actions as stakeholders are intent on seeing substantive 
behaviours, and they are more likely to monitor and scrutinize the outcomes (Stevens, Steensma, 
Harrison & Cochran, 2005). For example, in their examination of ethics codes Stevens et al., 
(2005) found that perceived pressure from market stakeholders lead to greater substantive 
actions. Thus, with the increased stakeholder pressure (Berrone & Gomez-Mejia, 2009; Stevens 
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et al., 2005) firms with substantive actions are more likely to use the limited space on their 
websites discussing what they have done, as opposed to what they will or plan to do. On the 
other hand, firms that use their websites to discuss what they will do may strategically do so to 
deflect the attention from their lack of substantive actions. This may lead stakeholders to 
perceive symbolic actions negatively. 
 The objectivity and availability of environmental performance data for visibly polluting 
firms means that symbolic actions are not only less effective but could be harmful as the green 
talk is not backed up with any green walk (Christmann & Taylor, 2006). With time 
environmental performance has become increasingly comprehensive and easy to monitor, 
although its measurement is far from perfect. For example, the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) 
offers facility level data on the toxic chemical releases and waste management activities of 
22,880 facilities/plants operating in the United States (the Canadian equivalent is the National 
Pollutant Release Inventory (NPRI)). It measures air, water and land releases both on-site and 
off-site, and has been widely used in academia (e.g., Clelland, Douglas & Henderson, 2006; 
Dooley and Fryxell 1999; Feldman, Soyka & Ameer, 1997; Klassen & Whybark, 1999; Konar 
and Cohen 2001). Similar objective and publicly available environmental data is widely 
available and commonly used by third-party organizations to rank corporations based on their 
environmental performance. Research has shown that symbolic actions are most effective when 
performance is difficult to measure (Christmann & Taylor, 2006). However, because 
environmental performance is relatively easy to measure and objective data is widely available 
for the firms in our sample, symbolic actions may indicate a lack of substantive actions which 
can be verified through the use of publicly available objective data. While stakeholders may not 
necessarily look into such data, they may make the assumption that if a firm spends valuable 
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space on its website discussing what it plans or hopes to do in the future, it is because it has done 
very little to date.  
 Lastly, because symbolic actions are less effective in visibly polluting industries, firms 
that utilize symbolic actions may be subject to increased suspicion from stakeholders. That is, if 
symbolic actions are not effective, why would a firm utilize them? Companies that use symbolic 
actions may be perceived by stakeholders as untrustworthy and opportunistic (King & Lenox, 
2000).  This may prompt stakeholders to limit their transactions with the firms until evidence of 
more substantive actions are forthcoming.  
 Therefore, because symbolic actions are not effective in reducing the real costs of poor 
environmental performance, and subject to greater stakeholder pressures and scrutiny in 
polluting industries thus rendering their use suspect, we first make the following hypothesis: 
 Hypothesis 2: Symbolic actions will have a negative effect on financial performance 
Green-Washing  
 Given that it is a relatively new concept, there are few definitions of green-washing. One 
definition offered by Ramus amd Montiel (2005) is that green-washing is “disinformation 
disseminated by an organization so as to present an environmentally responsible public image”, 
where disinformation refers to deliberately misleading information. We view green-washing 
differently as our interest is not in “disinformation”, but information that is not backed by 
substantive actions. Accordingly, we define green-washing as symbolic information emanating 
from within an organization without substantive actions. Or, in other words, discrepancy 
between the green talk and green walk. 
Green-washing differs from symbolic action in that it takes into account both symbolic 
and substantive actions. That is, a firm that has both symbolic and substantive actions (on the 
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same issue) would not be classified as green-washing (as the symbolic action is not 
“disinformation” because it is backed by substantive action), only a firm that demonstrates 
symbolic actions without substance would be. Green-washing can thus be viewed as the 
difference between symbolic and substantive actions. In this way, green-washing can be used as 
a strategic communication tool to camouflage a firm’s lack of efforts in engaging in true 
environmental performance.  
 Hypothesis 1 and 2 assumed that stakeholders would be able to tell the difference 
between symbolic and substantive actions for firms in visibly polluting industries, and that they 
would reward firms accordingly. We make the same assumption here, but because green-
washing examines the difference between symbolic and substantive actions we hypothesize that 
stakeholders will punish firms for green-washing. We make this hypothesis because green-
washing in visibly polluting industries is more likely to be identified and subsequently punished.   
 First, because information on environmental performance in visibly polluting industries 
tends to be objective and widely available, it is relatively easy for stakeholders to identify green-
washing (Christmann & Taylor, 2006). Once identified, green-washing firms may be viewed as 
untrustworthy, manipulative, and opportunistic (King & Lenox, 2000). For example, consumers 
armed with publicly available data and information from other independent third-parties and 
institutional watchdogs are more likely to be aware of green-washing in visibly polluting 
industries. Also, they are less likely to attach importance to symbolic actions that are 
unaccompanied with substantive actions, thus offering their business to firms with substantive 
environmental actions. Green-washing might also cause employees to lose trust in their 
organization as the unsubstantiated claims may make employees uncomfortable as unwilling 
participants. Other organizations may also lose trust in a green-washing firm (King & Lenox, 
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2000) making them less likely to conduct business and exchange resources with them. Through 
interactions with the firm they may fear being labelled as green-washers themselves, further 
increasing their desire to distance themselves. In addition, green-washing will not help a firm 
avoid government regulation, or evade significant fines, penalties and disposal and clean-up 
costs (Bansal & Clelland, 2004). Damage to these stakeholder relationships will ultimately lead 
to decreased financial performance. 
 Second, firms in visibly polluting industries are subject to increased stakeholder scrutiny. 
As stated by Berrone and Gomez-Mejia (2009: 103): “Because environmental issues are now a 
major social concern, companies in polluting industries face tight governmental regulations, 
increased media attention, and strong environmental activism.” Green-washing is therefore less 
likely to be effective, more likely to be perceived, and finally more likely to be punished. 
 Third, with increased stakeholder scrutiny and pressure come heightened expectations for 
environmental performance. These expectations are heightened for firms in visibly polluting 
industries as these corporations are viewed as leading causes of environmental damage, and are 
thus expected to alleviate or at least minimize the damage. Failure to meet these expectations 
will ultimately result in a decrease in financial performance. For example, in regards to product 
recalls highly reputable firms tend to suffer greater declines in shareholder wealth because 
consumers have higher expectations and punish these firms more severely when their 
expectations are violated (Rhee & Haunschild, 2006). Furthermore, symbolic attempts to 
convince stakeholders that firms have met their expectations, which it has been argued are 
unlikely to be successful in visibly polluting industries without substantive actions, will only 
serve to further harm financial performance. 
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 Thus for visibly polluting industries, because (1) information on environmental 
performance is widely available; (2) firms are subject to increased stakeholder scrutiny, and; (3) 
stakeholders hold higher environmental expectations, we hypothesize that green-washing will 
have a negative effect on financial performance. 
Hypothesis 3: Green-washing will have a negative effect on financial performance 
Green-Highlighting 
In contrast to green-washing, green-highlighting represents information “disseminated by 
an organization so as to present an environmentally responsible public image” (partial definition 
of green-washing from the 10th edition of the Concise Oxford English Dictionary, from Ramus & 
Montiel, 2005). The key distinction between green-highlighting and green-washing, is that the 
former’s use of symbolic action is backed by substantive actions, or in other words, the external 
communication of environmental issues are synchronized with internal actions. Thus green-
highlighting can contain both symbolic and substantive action, where the firm discusses 
environmental responsibility in terms of what they are doing currently or have done (substantive 
action), and what they plan to do in the future (symbolic action). 
We believe that green-highlighting will have a positive effect on financial performance 
for two reasons. First, examining external promises, the corporate branding literature has shown 
that alignment between a firm’s external brand communication and its internal values and actions 
is one of the key drivers of a corporate brand’s performance; financially and reputation wise 
(Hatch and Shultz 2001). In the case of visibly polluting firms, validation of the alignment 
between green actions and green talks can be obtained by the widely available data on the 
environmental performance of these firms. In providing substantive actions firms validate their 
environmental performance, and give credence to future environmental plans (symbolic actions). 
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Thus, the key to effective symbolic action is its accompaniment with substantive actions, and 
green high-lighting combines talking the talk with walking the walk. 
Second, the combined effect of current substantive action with future plans illustrated in 
current symbolic actions demonstrates a heightened commitment to the natural environment. 
Thus organizations are not only able to inform stakeholders of what they have done and are 
currently doing in regards to the natural environment, but also what they plan to do in the future. 
Previously we argued that symbolic actions on their own would not be related to financial 
performance, but when symbolic actions are combined with substantive actions, we believe that 
stakeholders are more likely to believe and trust the firm’s future environmental commitments 
and plans. 
Thus for visibly polluting industries, because (1) past and current substantive actions 
provide validation to future-oriented symbolic actions, and; (2) the combined effect of 
substantive and symbolic actions demonstrates greater environmental commitment, we 
hypothesize that green-highlighting will have a positive effect on financial performance. 




 The sample comes from the annual ranking of the Financial Post’s top 500 Canadian 
companies for 2008, ranked by revenue for the previous year. Such a sampling frame is 
recommended for coding websites (McMillan, 2000) and has been adopted in previous research. 
For example, Esrock and Leichty (1998) used a similar sampling frame by randomly selecting 
100 companies from the Fortune 500 list.  
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 With a focus on the natural environment and hypotheses that were specific to visibly 
polluting industries, we examined the chemical, energy, mining, and forestry industries from the 
Financial Post 500. Furthermore, companies in visibly polluting industries are more likely to 
report information on their environmental responsibility, thereby increasing the likelihood that 
this research would generate a non-zero variable for environmental performance (Bansal, 2005). 
With a focus on these four industries, our initial sample size was 130 companies. Furthermore, a 
number of these firms did not have a website or had merged with other companies, resulting in a 
final sample of 103 firms: 10 companies in the chemical industry, 54 in energy, 16 in forest and 
23 in mining. 
Dependent Variables 
 Environmental Categories. Although some researchers believe that simply coding the 
homepage is sufficient for website coding (Ha & James, 1998), this has been criticized for a lack 
of comprehensiveness (McMillan, 2000). Following this argument and more recent website 
coding (e.g., Dou & Krishnamurthy, 2007; Macias & Lewis, 2004), to gain an inclusive 
understanding of how the web was being used to convey environmentally responsible 
information the entire website was examined. Therefore, the unit of analysis in this study was the 
complete website, and the coding unit was corporate social responsibility material related to the 
natural environment (McMillan, 2000).  
In addition, we excluded additional reports such as sustainability or corporate social 
responsibility reports as not all companies included their reports on their websites and for those 
that did the reports were accessed via an external link. Thus we excluded such reports not only 
for consistency across the sample, but more importantly, because our focus was specifically on 
website material and not external links or documents. While other studies have examined 
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sustainability reports (e.g., Arevalo, 2010; Castelló, & Lozano, 2011; Habisch, Patelli, Pedrini, & 
Schwartz, 2011), to our knowledge, none have examined environmental material on corporate 
websites. 
 Obtaining and coding the website data involved three steps. First, the lead author and a 
research assistant copied and pasted all website information pertaining to the environment onto a 
word file, averaging just under four pages per company and 499 pages in total. Saving web-
pages first and coding them later is the preferred approach for coding websites because of the 
speed with which websites change (Dou & Krishnamurthy, 2007; Macias & Lewis, 2004). We 
also limited this initial coding period to one week to minimize any website changes during the 
coding (McMillan, 2000).  
The authors conducted a series of meetings and training sessions with the research 
assistant to ensure proper coding, and in particular, that no data was missed. For example, the 
research assistant was instructed to code 10 companies which the lead author coded as well. Any 
discrepancies or problems with the coding were identified and resolved before actual coding 
began.  
To ensure reliability, 20 companies overlapped between the first author and the research 
assistant. In all cases the information attained from the websites by the different coders were the 
same. The percentage of cross-coded websites was over 15 percent of the entire sample. This is 
in line with the majority of studies that analyze content of websites, which cross-code 10-20 
percent of all sample sites (McMillan, 2000). To control for changes in content on the websites, 
coders were instructed to code on the same day at the same time (McMillan, 2000, referencing 
Wassmuth & Thompson, 1999). The time required to code individual websites ranged from five 
minutes to over 30 minutes for the most environmentally responsible companies. 
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 Second, a preliminary analysis of the raw data was conducted to identify environmental 
categories in the sample. The goal here was to come up with environmental categories that were 
consistently identified in the sample, so we could break down (1) the environmental issues firms 
were engaged in; and, (2) the number of activities each firm was involved in within each 
category. This enabled us to begin to quantify the data. The final categories included: managing 
greenhouse gas emissions, product innovation, lifecycle analysis, environmental management 
systems, technological development, carbon capture and storage, recovery projects, stakeholder 
engagement, employee training, conservation and restoration, waste management, recycling, and 
independent reviews/audits1. Carbon capture and storage, and recovery projects were so similar 
as described on the corporate websites that we ultimately decided to combine them into a single 
category. Specific examples of the each environmental category are provided in Appendix A. 
 Third, armed with the list of categories the research assistant analyzed the raw data 
identifying what environmental categories each firm was engaged in, as well as the number of 
activities within each category. Before the coding at this stage began, however, the authors again 
conducted a series of meetings and training sessions with the research assistant to ensure proper 
coding. This involved the lead author and the research assistant coding the same five companies, 
then going through the coding together resolving any discrepancies or problems. This process 
was repeated three times at which point the research assistant was very proficient at coding. 
 In the end we had firm level data on the environmental categories engaged in, and the 
number of firm activities per category. 
Financial Performance. Financial performance was measured using Return on Assets 
(ROA) in 2008 and 2009. We decided to use a lagged measure of ROA because we wanted to 
                                                          
1
 We initially included LEED certification but it was subsequently dropped as only one company in the entire 
sample mentioned it. 
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capture both the immediate financial benefits or consequences to what was reported on corporate 
websites in 2008, but also anticipated the need for the passage of time for actual financial 
outcomes to be manifested. Where possible we obtained the financial values for net income and 
total assets from Compustat. For about half of the companies in our sample no data was available 
on this database, thus we used annual reports accessed via company websites. 
Given that some of our firms were private companies, financial data was not publicly 
available; this was the case particularly in the mining industry. In these situations we utilized the 
industry mean as the value for ROA. 
Independent Variables 
 Substantive Action. This variable corresponds to the extent to which a firm provides 
concrete actions, or steps they have taken to care for the natural environment. For example, on 
their website Imperial Oil explains what they have done to improve, and by how much they have 
improved, their energy efficiency (http://www.imperialoil.ca): 
We continue to seek ways to improve the energy efficiency of our operations. In 
2008, for example, we installed a high-efficiency vacuum furnace and heat 
exchangers at Dartmouth refinery to reduce energy use and capture waste heat. 
Through these and other improvements, our refineries are 15 percent more energy 
efficient than in 1990. 
 
 To code substantive action, the research assistant who had done the previous coding and 
at this point had developed a comprehensive understanding of the data, first read the material of 
10 companies then gave them a preliminary value from 1-7, where 1 = no substantive action and 
7 = all substantive action. After completing the 10 companies the research assistant had a greater 
understanding of what might constitute a three or a six for example. He then redid the 10 
companies and continued to code the entire sample. Importantly, a single research assistant 
coded the entire sample in this manner to ensure consistent coding through-out. 
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 Symbolic Action. This variable corresponds to the extent to which a firm discusses their 
commitment to the natural environment and their future plans. By measuring symbolic actions in 
this way firms could have both a high score for symbolic and substantive actions. Thus firms 
could either discuss their commitment and future plans without substantive actions, with 
substantive actions, or perhaps provide substantive actions alone without a discussion about their 
environmental commitment or future plans.  
 As an example of symbolic action, on their website Cascades Inc states: “It is because of 
its concern for transparency and credibility that Cascades initiated the steps that would lead to its 
first sustainable development plan” (www.cascades.com, italics added). In this sentence they 
mention their commitment to the environment and future plans, but have not provided actual 
actions completed.   
 Symbolic action was coded by the same research assistant in the same manner as 
substantive action. 
  Green-washing. In the hypothesis development section we discussed green-washing as 
the difference between symbolic and substantive actions. Accordingly, we measured it by 
subtracting the value of substantive action from that of symbolic action, where a high positive 
number indicates high symbolic action with little to no substantive action, and a high negative 
number indicates high substantive action with little to no symbolic action. The higher the number 
the greater the green-washing. Green-washing ranged from negative five to four, and had a mean 
value of -.47 (s.d. = 1.49).  
 Green-highlighting. In the hypothesis development section we discussed green-
highlighting as the addition of symbolic and substantive actions, where a high positive number 
indicates a high combination of the two types of actions, and the higher the number the higher 
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the green-highlighting. Green-highlighting ranged from two to 11, and had a mean value of 5.6 
(s.d. = 2.83). 
Control Variables 
 There were four controls variables in this study. Size was controlled because larger firms 
tend to pollute more, and studies have found that larger firms are more likely than smaller firms 
to integrate environmental practices into their organizations (Chen, Lai & Wen, 2006; Lopez-
Gamero, Claver-Cortes & Molina-Azorin, 2008; Moore, 2001; Russo & Fouts, 1997). In 
addition, previous research has used size as a proxy for firm visibility as highly visible 
companies are often under increased scrutiny from stakeholders (Adams & Hardwick, 1998; 
Brammer & Millington, 2008). Increased firm visibility could lead to higher costs associated 
with increased taxation, fines and litigation for example. It might also lead to increased 
environmental performance as these firms seek to appease the increased demands from 
stakeholders and to avoid or pre-empt environmental legislation (Brammer & Millington, 2008). 
It was measured as the log of total assets. 
 Slack was included as Douglas and Judge (1995) found a positive relationship between 
the amount of resources available for natural environment issues and the level of integration of 
environmental issues into the strategic planning process. In addition, Lee and Rhee (2007) found 
that a firm’s slack resources were significantly related to environmental strategic change. Slack 
was measured as the logged value of the ratio of current assets to current liabilities (Bansal, 
2005; Schuler, 1996). 
 Financial leverage (sometimes referred to as risk), measured as total liabilities divided by 
shareholder’s equity, was controlled as prior studies have found level of risk to be related to all 
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major types of performance (Bromiley, 1991; Miller & Leiblein, 1996; Orlitzky et al., 2001). 
The sin value was used to bring it to normality. 
 Lastly, given that different industries may be subject to different stakeholder pressures 
related to the natural environment (government regulation, media exposure, environmental 
groups), industry was dummy coded using the NAICS code. 
 
RESULTS 
 Our results are broken down into four sections, presented based on our research 
questions. The first two sections address our descriptive questions and the remaining two address 
symbolic and substantive actions, green-washing, and green-highlighting. 
Research Question One: Environmental Issues Addressed 
Our first research question asked what specific environmental issues top Canadian firms 
address. As described in the methodology section we identified a number of environmental 
categories/issues addressed by the companies in our sample. Table 1 provides descriptive 
statistics for each issue ranked by mean value. 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Taken as a whole, we see that environmental conservation had the highest occurrence 
(mean = 2.89 with a range of 25), and lifecycle analysis the least (mean = .10). Furthermore, 
within each industry environmental conservation had the highest occurrence among all 
environmental categories. In regards to the least occurrences within industries, in the chemical 
industry both employee training and carbon capture & recovery barely had any activity (mean = 
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.10 for both); in the energy industry product innovation and lifecycle analysis were very low 
(mean = .07 for both); in the forestry industry employee training, carbon capture & recovery, 
lifecycle analysis, technology development, and other were all low (mean = .06 for all); finally, 
in the mining industry  product innovation and carbon capture & recovery were non-existent.  
Research Question Two: Cross-Industry Comparisons 
Our second research question asked how the environmental issues addressed by firms 
differed between industries. In answering this question some of the most interesting and 
surprising results occurred where no significant differences were found. For example, despite the 
relatively high mean values for management of greenhouse gases and environmental 
conservation, there were no significant differences across the four industries. Furthermore, these 
were the only two categories where the mean for all industries was at least one; meaning that on 
average firms in all industries addressed management of greenhouse gases and environmental 
conservation at least once on their corporate websites. For management of greenhouse gases, 
industries ranged between 1.00 for the chemical industry and 1.70 for the energy industry, and 
for environmental conservation, industries ranged between 1.60 for the chemical industry and 
3.81 for the forestry industry. These are encouraging results which suggest that almost all firms 
in the industries we examined believe that the management of greenhouse gases and 
environmental conversation are important environmental issues which they can address. 
Perhaps the most surprising non-significant result, however, is that there were no 
significant differences in the “Total” amount of environmental activities (measured as the sum 
total of all a firm’s environmental activities), despite an average of just over eight activities per 
firm, with a standard deviation of close to 11. 
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Table 2 presents the means and standard deviations per environmental issue per industry, 
as well as any significant differences between industries.  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 As shown in Table 2, firms in the forestry industry appear to be particularly good at using 
their corporate websites to portray a positive image with regard to addressing the environmental 
issues shown as compared to the chemical, energy, and mining industries. For example, the 
forestry industry was significantly higher than all other industries in stakeholder engagement. 
Indeed, when we look at the mean values, taken together the firms in the forestry industry 
performed better than the other industries in all areas listed in Table 2, with the exception of 
product innovation. The chemical industry performed particularly well with regard to product 
innovation, with a significantly higher amount of activities than the mining and energy 
industries.  
 As a whole, firms in the energy and mining industries seemed to perform the worst as 
they did not have a significantly higher amount of activities within any of our identified 
environmental categories. The greatest disparity was between the forestry and energy industries, 
as they had the greatest number of significant differences in environmental categories 
(significant differences across four of the five environmental categories mentioned).  
Research Question Three: Symbolic and Substantive Actions 
 Our third research question asked if both symbolic and substantive actions benefit a firm 
financially. Table 3 provides the descriptive statistics and correlations among the variables used 
to test hypotheses 1-4. 




Insert Table 3 about here 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 Table 3 shows that ROA is significantly correlated to: size (r = .37), meaning larger firms 
tend to have higher ROA; industry (r = -.37); meaning that as industries go from chemical, 
energy, forestry to mining they tend to have lower ROA; and green-washing (r = -.29), meaning 
that firms that green-wash tend to have lower ROA.  
 We see that size is correlated with: industry (r = -.27), meaning that our firms tend to 
decrease in size as they proceed through our dummy coding; both symbolic and substantive 
actions (r = .42), meaning that larger firms tend to have high symbolic and substantive actions; 
with green-washing (r = -.29), meaning larger firms tend not to green-wash; and with green-
highlighting (r = .38), meaning larger firms tend to green-highlight. 
We also see that symbolic and substantive action are correlated (r = .59), indicating that 
most firms that take substantive action also spend considerable space on their websites 
discussing symbolic action. Green-washing is negatively correlated with substantive action (r = -
.67) as it should be, and green-highlighting is positively correlated with both substantive (r = .92) 
and symbolic (r = .86) action as it should be. Lastly, green-washing and green-highlighting are 
negatively correlated (r = -.33) 
Due to the high correlations between green-washing and green-highlighting, and 
substantive and symbolic action, we run two separate regressions, one that includes symbolic and 
substantive actions as the only independent variables, and one that includes green-washing and 
green-highlighting as the only independent variables. To ensure that the relatively high 
correlations between symbolic and substantive action, and between green-washing and green-
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highlighting, were not adversely affecting the results, we ran separate regressions. Since the 
results were the same we present the results for symbolic and substantive actions together in one 
table but in different models, and we do the same for green-washing and green-highlighting. 
 The results for the regression examining substantive and symbolic actions are provided in 
Table 4.  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 Our first hypothesis stated that substantive actions would have a positive effect on 
financial performance. Our non-significant result for substantive actions in Table 4 does not 
support this hypothesis. 
 Our second hypothesis stated that symbolic actions would have a negative effect on 
financial performance. The negatively significant result (p < .05) for symbolic action in Table 4 
supports this hypothesis. 
Research Question Four: Green-Washing and Green-Highlighting 
 Our fourth and final research question examined green-washing and green-highlighting. 
The results for the regression examining green-washing and green-highlighting are provided in 
Table 5.  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 Our third hypothesis stated that green-washing would have a negative effect on financial 
performance. The negatively significant result (p < .05) for green-washing in Table 5 supports 
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this hypothesis and suggests that talking about one’s “greenness” without actual green 
behaviours negatively affects a firm financially.  
 Our fourth hypothesis stated that green-highlighting would have a positive effect on 
financial performance. Our non-significant result for green-highlighting in Table 5 does not 
support this hypothesis. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 Environmental performance is usually discussed as an all-encompassing construct. In this 
study we found that top performing Canadian firms in visibly polluting industries tend to focus 
on particular environmental issues while ignoring others. Management of greenhouse-gases and 
environmental conservation were of particular importance to the firms in our sample regardless 
of industry. This may be because governments (and other stakeholder) are particularly concerned 
with these issues as attempts are made to deal with climate change and environmental destruction 
and degradation. This has lead to greater regulations, and a greater threat of future regulations, in 
these areas as opposed to other areas such as lifecycle analysis or employee training 
(environmental areas that were found to have little to no firm activity). 
 Relative success in certain environmental areas and relative failure in others (based 
purely as a comparison to peers within this sample), suggests that organizations are only able to 
deal with certain areas at a time. Indeed, it would be extremely difficult for a single firm to 
perform well in all environmental categories we identified, and no firm in our sample was able to 
do so. Therefore, it may be in the best interest of governments to focus on the areas of greatest 
importance, enabling firms to make quick progress in these areas without overburdening them by 
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enforcing all environmental areas simultaneously, while also permitting governments to focus 
and enforce in these particular areas. 
 We also found differences across industries, demonstrating that the importance of the 
environmental area differs across industries. For example, product innovation was clearly of high 
importance in the chemical industry but was not for the energy or mining industries. The strong 
environmental performance in certain areas is likely an indication of the financial incentives that 
exist in the area. Researchers examining the relationship between environmental and financial 
performance might, therefore, specify the industry and the environmental issue they are 
investigating. In the chemical industry for example, the relationship between environmentally 
friendly product innovation and financial performance is likely positive, but a negative 
relationship may exist between stakeholder engagement and financial performance (based on the 
low levels of stakeholder engagement in this industry). This reasoning is aligned with recent 
recommendations in the literature to move past one-size-fits-all prescriptions in our analysis of 
the relationship between environmental (or social) performance and financial performance, and 
to instead examine particular areas and contexts where financial benefits can be obtained 
(Barnett, 2007; Brammer & Pavelin, 2006). Governments might also find greater success in 
improving the environmental performance of firms by focusing on the areas that hold the greatest 
financial incentives. 
 Another intriguing result was that the forestry industry outperformed the energy industry 
in four out of the five environmental areas identified in Table 2. This result may have occurred 
for a number of reasons such as tighter government regulation, greater stakeholder pressure, 
weaker lobbying groups in the forestry industry, and so on. Reasons for such strong differences 
would merely be speculation at this point, but the results represent a rich area for future research 
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as we investigate why some industries are clearly environmentally outperforming others. This 
would represent a significant research shift in the level of analysis, moving from the firm-level to 
the industry-level. Given that environmental problems are global, moving to higher levels of 
analyses may be both necessary and fruitful. 
 Contrary to our hypothesis, substantive actions were not related to increased financial 
performance. In contrast, and consistent with our hypothesis, symbolic actions were related to 
decreased financial performance. This suggests that for firms in visibly polluting industries, the 
best use of space on their corporate websites would be to discuss actions completed instead of 
future plans and potential environmental commitments. In fact, the discussion of future plans and 
potential commitments may harm the firm financially. 
Many studies have investigated the relationship between environmental and financial 
performance and most have found a positive relationship (e.g., Margolis & Walsh, 2003; 
Orlitzky et al., 2003; Russo & Fouts, 1997). Our study breaks down environmental performance 
into symbolic and substantive actions, and finds that only symbolic actions effect firms 
financially. 
 It may be that in visibly polluting industries, because of the heightened stakeholder 
pressures and scrutiny (Berrone & Gomez-Mejia, 2009; Stevens et al., 2005), firms are expected 
take real and substantive actions toward environmental performance. Such expectations may 
mean that even if they are fulfilled, they are not rewarded; a firm has simply met the standard. In 
contrast, the use of symbolic actions may be perceived as an attempt to make up for the lack of 
substantive actions, ultimately leading to negative financial consequences.  
 It may also be that while the substantive actions of the firms in our sample did not lead to 
financially significant efficiency improvements, they may have helped them to avoid potential 
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environmental liabilities, fines, penalties, clean-up costs (Bansal & Clelland, 2004), negative 
investor reactions (Konar & Cohen, 2001) and perceptions of increased risk (Bansal & Clelland, 
2004). All potential costs that may have been realized by firms using symbolic actions. As 
summarized in Figure 1 (which we discuss further later in the paper), future research needs to 
address the underlying mechanism (mediators) that drive the negative relationship between 
symbolic action and financial performance.  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 To the best of our knowledge this is the only study to date that has examined the financial 
implications to green-washing, and has discussed the concept of green-highlighting. Measuring 
green-washing as the difference between symbolic and substantive actions, we found that it was 
negatively related to financial performance. We argued that this would be the case because in 
visibly polluting industries (1) information on environmental performance tends to be objective 
and widely available, making it relatively easy for stakeholders to identify green-washing; (2) 
firms are subject to increased stakeholder scrutiny making the identification of green-washing 
more likely, and; (3) firms are subject to higher stakeholder expectations pertaining to the natural 
environment, and failure to meet these expectations results in significant financial losses. In sum, 
we argued that green-washing would be more likely to be perceived, less effective, and finally 
more likely to be punished. 
 Measuring green-highlighting as the addition of symbolic and substantive action we 
found that it was not related to financial performance. It appears that all symbolic actions, even 
when accompanied by substantive actions (which appear to have mitigated the negative effects 
The Harm of Symbolic Actions and Green-Washing  
31 
 
thus resulting in a non-significant finding), harm a firm financially. Thus firms in visibly 
polluting industries would be well advised not to discuss symbolic actions on their corporate 
websites.  
 We have been using two main arguments to explain the consistent negative effect of 
symbolic actions on financial performance also evident in the negative results for green-washing: 
First that in using symbolic actions firms do not gain the potentially beneficial financial 
consequences to substantive actions and may incur greater negative consequences; and second, 
that stakeholders will perceive the symbolic actions of firms in visibly polluting industries 
negatively and ultimately punish the firm financially. While both arguments are valid, the latter 
may be particularly true given the non-significant relationship between green-highlighting and 
financial performance. That is, if a firm has both substantive and symbolic actions, they should 
still benefit from the real improvements of increased environmental performance such as 
lowering compliance costs, reducing waste, and improving efficiency and productivity (Ambec 
& Lanoie, 2008; Hart, 1995; Hart & Ahuja, 1996). Yet it appears, that any potential benefits 
from substantive actions (which themselves would appear to be minimal given the non-
significant finding for substantive actions) are outweighed by the negative financial implications 
to symbolic actions. How might we explain this relationship? We do so using prospect theory 
(Kahneman & Taversky, 1979).  
 Prospect theory states that people value gains and losses differently, and that we are more 
sensitive to losses than we are to equivalent gains (Brenner, Rottenstreich, Sood & Bilgin, 2007). 
For example, consumer research finds strong evidence for loss aversion, where people react to 
losses more strongly than equivalent gains (e.g., the pleasure felt from finding $10 would be less 
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in absolute terms as compared to the pain felt from losing $10) (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; 
Novemsky & Kahneman, 2005; Tversky & Kahneman, 1991).  
 Applied to our study, the results suggest that the pain/aversion people feel as a result of 
symbolic actions (a perceived loss) drives stakeholders to punish the firm more strongly than 
would be the drive to reward firms for substantive actions (a perceived gain). The sensitivity to 
losses/negative information is greater than toward gains/positive information.  
 Symbolic actions and green-washing may represent a perceived loss from the perspective 
of stakeholders. It may be that the stakeholders reading corporate websites expect to find what 
firms are doing currently, not what they plan to do. Thus any discussion on future plans may be 
perceived as an attempt to cover up the lack of substantive actions, or a means to falsely beef-up 
the “meagre” substantive actions. As laid out in Figure 1, future research should test whether 
perceived loss or lack of commitment mediates the relationship between green-washing and 
financial performance. In addition, future research can also identify boundaries conditions where 
green-highlighting can play a positive role in financial performance. For example, as we argued, 
the operations of firms in visibly polluting industries are under the careful scrutiny of regulators 
and external stakeholders, therefore, symbolic actions alone or green-highlighting do not benefit 
financial performance. However, for firms in other industries such as consumer goods (e.g., 
Body Shop) or retail (e.g., Starbucks), symbolic actions or green highlighting can be important 
signals of the firms’ values in environmental issues. Such signals can serve as an important 
symbolic brand attribute to attract consumers who share similar values, and at the same time 
differentiate the brands from competitor brands who do not manifest such values.  
Lastly, as Figure 1 indicates, future research can also test the antecedents of firms’ 
symbolic actions, substantive actions, green-washing and green-highlighting. For example, there 
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can be two types of drivers (internal and external) stimulating firms’ communication and 
activities with regard to environmental responsibilities. External pressures, for example, may 
come from a regulatory body, industry norms, or competition where substantive actions are 
perceived prevalent. However, firms’ communication and behaviours with regard to 
environmental responsibilities can be internally driven by firm values, endorsed and 
implemented from within (Hatch and Schultz 2001). We suspect that in this case, green-
highlighting and symbolic actions will have significant and positive effects on financial 
performance. Future research could examine these different and potential drivers of corporate 
environmental performance, ultimately linking it to financial performance.  
Limitations 
 This study suffered from four limitations. First, we did not investigate causation, so it is 
possible that firms with higher financial performance (i.e., ROA) were more likely to take 
substantive environmental actions. It may be that higher financial performance enables these 
firms to take substantive actions, whereas firms with lower financial performance can only afford 
symbolic actions. We do not, however, believe this to be the case with our dataset, considering 
that it was obtained from the Financial Post’s top 500 Canadian companies, ranked by revenue. 
Thus while there were differences across firms in the sample, all had strong revenue, and it is 
likely that all could afford substantive actions if they so desired. Furthermore, ambiguity 
surrounding causation is a common and ongoing issue in research that examines environmental 
and financial performance (Salzman et al., 2005).  
 Second, we examined companies in Canada only. While our focus on Canadian 
corporations was (1) in response to the criticism that research needs to examine environmental 
performance outside the predominant U.S. sample (Salzman et al., 2005); (2) pertinent to our 
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focus on visibly polluting industries; and, (3) important to our arguments about increased 
stakeholder pressures, it is possible that our results will not generalize to firms in other countries. 
 Third, our measure of environmental performance was inductive and derived from the 
websites of the company’s in our sample. Whereas an objective and standardized set of measures 
on environmental performance is desirable, they run the risk of potentially being less relevant to 
the focal industries in our sample. Thus, our measure, while not without flaws, was particularly 
pertinent to the company’s under investigation, and was consistently measured across each firm 
in our sample thereby reducing coder subjectivity.  
 Fourth, this is a cross-sectional study where we examined environmental performance as 
reported on corporate websites in 2008 only. Future research would be required to see if our 
results are generalizable to other years, or if our findings change when examined longitudinally.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 Despite its importance to corporations and society, our understanding of corporate 
environmental performance is limited and understudied (Bansal & Gao, 2006). Our objective has 
been to develop a better understanding of corporate communications on environmental 
performance and the resulting financial implications. We obtained this objective through our four 
research questions. First, we listed 13 environmental categories and saw that the management of 
greenhouse-gases and environmental conservation were of greatest importance to the companies 
in our sample regardless of industry. Second, we delineated differences between industries, and 
in particular, noted that the forestry industry significantly outperformed the energy industry, and 
that industries can differ in which environmental categories they focus on. Third, we found that 
substantive actions neither harmed nor benefited financial performance, but symbolic actions 
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were related to decreased financial performance. Fourth and similarly, we found that green-
washing harms firms financially, and green-highlighting neither harms nor improves financial 
performance.  
 Without question, researchers will continue to investigate the complexities of corporate 
environmental performance and we hope that our study, particularly the future research 
suggestions and Figure 1, will inspire and prove beneficial. After all, the existence of our species 
and planet may depend on our understanding and ultimate promotion of corporate environmental 
performance. While misery loves company (Margolis & Walsh, 2003), we know that companies 
do not love misery, and the long-term sustainability of all companies is dependent on answering 
the world’s cry for repair. 
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Descriptive Statistics of Environmental Issues Discussed by Corporations 
Environmental 
Category 










1.45 2.62 17 
Stakeholder Engagement 
 
.98 1.63 7 
Environmental Audits 
 
.81 1.21 6 
Recycling 
 








.28 .45 1 
Waste Management 
 
.28 .69 4 
Employee Training 
 





.17 .63 5 
Carbon Capture and 
Recovery 
 
.14 .56 3 
Other 
 
.13 .41 2 
Lifecycle Analysis 
 
.10 .30 1 
Total 
 
8.15 10.85 50 
Note: N = 103 
 
  




Cross Industry Significant Differences per Environmental Issue 



















.30 (.48) .15 (.36) .62 (.50) .35 (.49) Forestry from 
energy (p < .01) 
Stakeholder Engagement 
 




.61 (.89) Forestry from 
chemical, mining 
(both p < .05) and 













.70 (1.57) .07 (.26) .38 (.81) .00 (.00) Chemical from 
energy and mining 
(both p < .05) 
Recycling 
 





energy (p < .01) 
 
  




Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Variable Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Lagged ROA 
 
-.05 .25         
2. Size 
 
22.17 1.42 .32        
3. Slack 
 
.90 .38 -.17 -.07       
4. Leverage 
 
.43 .42 .11 -.14 -.19      
5. Industry 
 




3.02 1.80 .17 .42 .08 .10 -.08    
7. Symbolic action 
 
2.55 1.36 -.09 .24 .10 .07 .01 .59   
8. Green-washing 
 




5.57 2.83 .07 .38 .10 .10 -.04 .92 .86 -.33 
Notes:  
1. Size and slack are logged values. Leverage is sin value.  
2. Correlations above .20 or below -.20 are significant at the 5 percent level; correlations above .25 or below -
.25 are significant at the .01 level. 
 
  




Regression Analysis for Substantive and Symbolic Actions 
Independent and 
control variables 
Unstandardized Coefficients (standard errors) 
 
















































.164 .156 .195 
Change in R2 
 
.191 .001 .045 
Change in F-Statistic 
 
5.996*** .127 5.693* 
Notes: 
1. Size and slack are logged values, leverage is sin value 
2. All p values reported are at two-tailed significance; t p<.10  * p<.05  ** p<.01 *** p<.001 
3. N = 103  




Regression Analysis for Green-Washing and Green-Highlighting 
Independent and 
control variables 
Unstandardized Coefficients (standard errors) 
 




















































.164 .191 .195 
Change in R2 
 
.197 .034 .012 
Change in F-Statistic 
 
5.996*** 4.313* 1.491 
Notes: 
1. Size and slack are logged values, leverage is sin value 
2. All p values reported are at two-tailed significance; t p<.10  * p<.05  ** p<.01 *** p<.001 
3. N = 103 
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Green  Highlighting 






Perceived legitimacy,  lack of 
trust,  perceived risk and 
commitment 
2) Potential Moderators:
When do green walk and 
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involvement as it 
relates to restoring 




donations to conserve 
habitat. 
 
“DuPont has a strategy for land conservation that includes placing 
surplus property into protected status through the company’s Land 
Legacy Program, as well as lending support to activities in local 
communities aimed at preserving green space. In addition, DuPont 











“Dow Canada has made major strides in reducing its impact on the 
environment. From 1996-2005, our Canadian operations reduced 
emissions of priority compounds—29 compounds listed as 
persistent, toxic, bio-accumulative, carcinogenic, ozone-depleting or 
high volume toxic substances—by 94 percent. For example, in 2001, 
Environment Canada and Dow agreed on a five-year voluntary 
control action approach, implementing a management strategy for 
1,2-dichloroethane (EDC) to minimize emissions at the Fort 
Saskatchewan, Alberta, production facility and the North Vancouver, 
British Columbia, distribution facility.  This Environmental 
Performance Agreement successfully reduced EDC emissions by 







the firm, excluding 
internal stakeholders 
such as employees. 
 
“Suncor proactively consults with stakeholders to continually 
improve on the work we are doing to preserve biodiversity. Suncor 
regularly seeks input from our Aboriginal neighbours on reclamation 
initiatives. We are a member of the Cumulative Environmental 
Management Association, a multi-stakeholder group in the Regional 
Municipality of Wood Buffalo, to develop and implement 
management tools to reduce ecosystem disturbance in the region. We 
consult with other resource companies about how to minimize local 
impacts. This includes sharing access roads or using land already 







“Agrium’s policy is to audit each major production facility every 
three years, at a minimum, and each retail outlet every two years. 
Agrium has employees who are qualified to perform compliance, 
system, process and regulatory EHS&S audits. In addition, external 
EHS&S specialists are engaged where appropriate to review the 
audit processes and standards.” 
 




Teck Cominco Ltd: “Overall, 2007 total recycled volumes from 
Operations increased significantly, due mainly to the addition of data 
from seven Operations to the company total (six Elk Valley Coal 
mines and the Lennard Shelf mine). The solid recycling volume 
increased from 35,928 tonnes in 2006 to 49,100 tonnes in 2007; 
these materials included a 37% increase in: lead-acid batteries, scrap 
metal and electronic waste (or “e-waste”; see below). The volumes 
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of liquid recycling increased significantly from 1,678 m3 in 2006 to 
4,789 m3 in 2007, again largely due to reporting of data from the 
additional Operations. Liquid materials consisted mainly of used oil 
and oily water. The “item count” of materials recycled in 2007 
remained similar to last year, numbering almost 29,000 items 









“Advanced technology to minimize our footprint. In-situ bitumen 
extraction allows Suncor to use only a fraction of the land required 
for conventional oil sands mining. In our natural gas operations, low-
impact seismic lines and horizontal drilling help reduce our 





…or descriptions of 
the environmental 
management 
system(s) in place. 
 
First Quantum Minerals Ltd: “The Company has environmental 
management systems in place at each of its current operations. The 
procedures and protocols that form the operating framework of the 
Company's environmental management systems are in line with ISO 
14001 requirements. The overall goals include: a commitment of 
management to pollution prevention; compliance with pertinent 
environmental regulations and legislation and continual improvement 
to protect the environment.” 
 
Waste management …programs within 
the organization 
designed to reduce 




Teck Cominco Ltd: “We apply the principles of sustainability to the 
management of materials that were traditionally thought of as waste. 
An ever-growing list of materials once considered waste are now 
used as or converted to useful products. Important examples 
include…” 
 
Employee training …employee training 




“Tolko’s Management Team…[ensures] that employees receive the 
education and training necessary for them to carry out their work in 
an environmentally responsible manner. Employees will actively 
participate in environmental management and challenge operating 








by the firm. 
 
Methanex Corp: “Our product, methanol, is a clear liquid made 
primarily from natural gas. It represents a low risk to the 
environment because it is soluble in water and readily biodegradable. 
In addition, the methanol production process is very clean, producing 
few solid or liquid wastes.”  
 
Carbon capture and 
storage and 
recovery projects 
…carbon capture and 
storage/recovery 
projects that the firm 
was involved in. 
 
“In 2007, Suncor participated in research on carbon capture and 
storage, investing more than $1.5 million.” 
Lifecycle analysis …the examination of 
the environmental 
impact of a product 
from its birth to its 
death, or beyond. 
 
“Product Stewardship is a product-centered approach to 
sustainability – a management concept that Alcan employs to 
consider the complete supply chain and downstream activities related 
to the life cycle of its products.” 
 
